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[557] 
What Happens When Species Move but 
Reserves Do Not? Creating Climate Adaptive 
Solutions to Climate Change 
Nicholas Whipps* 
Most U.S. laws and regulations are not well-suited to respond to the effects of climate 
change, and the Endangered Species Act—the central federal law meant to protect 
threatened and endangered species at all costs—is no different. Conservation banking, 
an Endangered Species Act policy, is a market-based conservation strategy that 
incentivizes landowners to conserve species on their land. However, fee simple 
conservation strategies are ill-suited to protecting species on the move due to climate 
change. This Note first highlights the inadequacies of the current conservation banking 
system, then suggests how policy makers can transfer the market-based credit system 
used in conservation banking to a more climate-adaptive system that protects species 
on the move, which would better meet the goal of the Endangered Species Act to 
restore populations of listed species. This market-driven climate-adaptive strategy is a 
more effective means of protecting species that will be moving, while also helping to 
decrease the traditional conflict between species protection and use of private land. 
 
 * Senior Articles Editor, Hastings Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California 
Hastings College of the Law. The Author would like to thank Professor David Takacs and the Hastings 
Law Journal Notes staff for their invaluable feedback throughout the editing process. 
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Introduction 
The bighorn sheep is an icon of the southwestern United States. 
Adapted to rocky terrain, they have lived in the Sierra Nevada 
mountains of California for over three hundred thousand years.1 Bighorn 
sheep have survived in the Sierra Nevada through at least three ice ages 
and subsequent periods of warming.2 Adept at lithely grappling on 
craggy surfaces, it appears as though all species of bighorn sheep are now 
facing their largest set of obstacles yet: humans and climate change.3 
 
 1. Overview of Sierra Nevada Bighorn Sheep Research Projects, Cal. Dep’t Fish & Game, 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/snbs/ProgramProjects.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (stating that the Sierra 
Nevada bighorn sheep’s history “goes back 300–400 thousand years”). 
 2. Id. (“[B]ighorn sheep have persisted in the Sierra Nevada through at least three ice ages.”). 
 3. See Christy M. McCain & Sarah R. B. King, Body Size and Activity Times Mediate 
Mammalian Responses to Climate Change, Global Change Biology, Jan. 22, 2014, at 1, 9 (“[L]arge-
bodied, obligatory diurnal or nocturnal mammals are rapidly responding to current climate change and 
many of these responses indicate higher extinction risks. Most of these mammals are the charismatic 
fauna of North America[, including] bighorn sheep . . . .”); see also Bighorn Sheep, U.S. Nat’l Park 
Serv., http://www.nps.gov/romo/naturescience/bighorn_sheep.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (“Under 
the pressures of disease, hunting, and habitat alteration, the bighorn population declined until the 
middle of this century, when research in the 1950’s indicated that about 150 bighorn remained in the 
area of Rocky Mountain National Park. The surviving bighorn herds were in areas less accessible to 
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After three hundred thousand years, California bighorn sheep, like 
their desert and Rocky Mountain relatives, are now facing pressure to 
move as a result of climate change.4 Although they can move on almost 
any hilly surface, these sheep are not adapted to living on land humans 
have altered for their own uses.5 Since humans have altered much of the 
western United States to suit their needs, bighorn sheep forced to move 
due to climate change pressures will continue to run into modified or 
destroyed habitat, which acts as a barrier preventing these sheep from 
finding a suitable habitat further north.6 
Scientists predict that temperatures in the United States will rise 
between four and eleven degrees Fahrenheit by 2100.7 This increase 
might be too great for many animals to acclimate, and many animals will 
 
human contact. Their range was limited to the isolated, high country regions . . . . The migrating, low-
country herds were gone.”); Sarah Jane Keller, In a New Study, Megafauna More Likely to Feel 
Climate Impacts than Smaller Species, High Country News (Jan. 27, 2014), 
https://www.hcn.org/blogs/ 
goat/among-north-american-mammals-iconic-ones-are-most-likely-to-feel-impacts-from-climate-change 
(“[L]arger animals, like moose or desert bighorn sheep have to migrate on a larger scale, and that’s 
often not possible because their habitats are too fragmented. If a herd of desert bighorn sheep tries to 
escape drought they are probably going to have to have to cross over vast, inhospitable valleys to do 
it.”); Basic Facts About Bighorn Sheep, Defenders of Wildlife, http://www.defenders.org/bighorn-
sheep/basic-facts (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (“While livestock is not as much of a threat as in the past, 
loss of habitat from development is an increasing threat.”). 
 4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Basic Facts About Bighorn Sheep, supra note 3 (“[L]oss of habitat from development is 
an increasing threat.”). 
 6. See Keller, supra note 3 (discussing difficulties larger animals, such as bighorn sheep, face 
while traveling through fragmented habitat); see also Peninsular Desert Bighorn Sheep Conservation, 
Cal. Dep’t Fish & Wildlife, 
https://www.dfg.ca.gov/wildlife/Bighorn/Desert/Peninsular/Conservation.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2015) (attributing bighorn sheep decline to several human activities, including “habitat loss and 
modification, human disturbance, fragmentation due to roads, rail and tram construction, livestock 
grazing, disease, poaching, and fire suppression”). 
 7. Future Climate Change, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/ 
future.html (last updated Mar. 4, 2014). The projected range depends on which set of predictions 
scientists use to calculate the temperature rise. Although all future predictions have uncertainty, scientists 
have reached a general consensus that the global temperature is rising. See Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis 131 fig.1.4 (2013) (showing 
potential future rise in global temperature projected to 2035); Climate Change Is Not Debateable, CNN 
Press Room (Feb. 23, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/23/climate-change-is-
not-debateable (“[B]etween 95 percent and 97 percent of scientists agree that climate change is 
happening now, that it’s damaging the planet and that it’s manmade.”). Approximately ninety-seven 
percent of climate scientists (climatologists) agree that human-caused climate change is occurring. 
Consensus: 97 of Climate Scientists Agree, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015) (citing William R. L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, 107 
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 12,107, 12,107 (2010)); Peter T. Doran & Maggie Kendall Zimmerman, 
Examining the Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 90 Eos 22, 23 (2009); see also Naomi Oreskes, 
The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 Sci. 1686, 1686 (2004)). 
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be unable to adapt to quickly enough to stay where they are.8 Like the 
bighorn, thousands of species are responding to the increase in 
temperature by moving or changing their species ranges an average of 
about seventeen kilometers a decade.9 At this level of movement, most 
of these species will encounter land that has been repurposed in some 
way for human use.10 Those that cannot survive in a human-dominated 
landscape may hit a wall of human development preventing them from 
finding suitable habitat elsewhere. These species could be hemmed in by 
a landscape changing coincident to climate change on one side, and 
human development on the other. Many species in this situation stand a 
high chance of going extinct without human intervention to help them 
survive. 
Relatively recently, humans have begun to manage populations of 
previously ignored species under the auspice of conservation.11 As 
humans living in a Western society, we tend to see solutions to other 
species’ problems through at least two lenses: human and cultural.12 In 
the case of climate-sensitive species, both lenses produce skewed results. 
From the human lens, unlike almost every other species on earth, 
humans have proven resilient in most every ecosystem we have 
encountered. Other species cannot acclimate to new habitats as well as 
humans can, and this sensitivity to change normally results in a decrease 
 
 8. “Adaptation” is a term often used interchangeably with “acclimation.” However, when 
biologists refer to adaptation, they are referring to the slow, multigenerational genetic changes that 
occur to species as the result of evolutionary pressures on a population. Conversely, individuals of a 
species “acclimate” to their surroundings when, for example, they move from a relatively oxygen-rich 
lower altitude to an oxygen-poor higher altitude. This acclimation is achieved, for instance, by 
producing more red blood cells to make it easier for the circulatory systems to carry enough oxygen to 
body tissues. See Ary A. Hoffmann & Carla M. Sgrò, Climate Change and Evolutionary Adaptation, 
470 Nature 479, 479 (2011) (discussing species’ evolutionary adaptation to climate change); see also 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 8 (11th ed. 2003) (defining acclimation as the 
“physiological adjustment by an organism to environmental change”). 
 9. See I-Ching Chen et al., Rapid Range Shifts of Species Associated with High Levels of Climate 
Warming, 333 Sci. 1024, 1024 (2011) (discussing the results of a meta-analysis of two taxa samples, 
representing 764 and 1367 species, respectively). In terms of latitude, species are moving at a “rate of 16.9 
kilometers per decade.” Id. Species are also moving up an average of 11 meters in altitude per decade. Id. 
 10. See Hillary Mayell, Human “Footprint” Seen on 83 Percent of Earth’s Land, Nat’l Geographic 
News (Oct. 25, 2002), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/10/1025_021025_HumanFootprint.html 
(“[Eighty-three] percent of the total land surface and 98 percent of the areas where it is possible to grow the 
world’s three main crops—rice, wheat, and maize—is directly influenced by human activities.”). 
 11. See generally Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2014). 
 12. See, e.g., Maria Kallery & Dimitris Psillos, Anthropomorphism and Animism in Early Years 
Science: Why Teachers Use Them, How They Conceptualise Them and What Are Their Views on 
Their Use, 34 Res. Sci. Educ. 291, 291 (2004) (discussing human anthropomorphization of observed 
animal behaviors). This can be seen when humans attribute human emotions to an animal. However, 
human perception also affects our attempts to recover species. For example, U.S. wildlife management 
policies have primarily been couched in our assumption that these animals are beneficial to humans. 
See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (“[F]ish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.”). 
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in species populations—sometimes to the point of extinction.13 In the 
human paradigm, one would presume that a rational response to an 
unsuitable habitat would be to either alter the habitat or move. For 
humans, a move of ten thousand miles would not necessarily spell death; 
it would simply require that we practice another viable way of life. Other 
species do not have this same behavioral plasticity. 
From the cultural lens, Western principles have affected the way we 
conserve species in the United States. One of our largest attempts to 
protect species has been to create wildlife refuges—land meant to be 
protected in perpetuity.14 Fee simple conservation in a climate-changing 
world may make sense within the human land use context.15 However, in 
the non-human setting, when a lack of necessary resources renders a 
species’ land unusable, some individuals of a species on that land may 
die, and others may move to survive.16 Especially considering the effect 
of climate change on many species’ ranges and some species’ connections 
to certain scarce resources,17 fee simple ownership would seem like a 
ridiculous system for many species. If, for example, a squirrel is 
intimately tied to a species of acorn tree for food and shelter, any land 
that does not have these trees would be worthless to that squirrel. If the 
tree range moves, so must the squirrel. Likewise, if the species of acorn 
tree is dependent on a certain temperature and precipitation range, these 
trees cannot survive when viable conditions are not present. 
The use of a fee simple paradigm to conserve non-human species is 
theoretically possible with active human involvement. Unlike most 
species, humans have the capacity to mold a plot of land to meet a wide 
variety of needs. On a small scale, we create artificial habitats with exotic 
pets in aquariums. Humans have also altered land for other species’ use 
 
 13. See infra Part II.A (discussing human-caused species declines primarily as the result of habitat 
modification). 
 14. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-1092, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: 
Additional Flexibility Needed to Deal with Farmlands Received from the Department of 
Agriculture 6 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/266901.pdf (“[T]he [Fish and Wildlife] 
Service . . . has received at least 1,400 easement and fee-simple farmlands from the Farm Service 
Agency since 1986 . . . . scattered across 38 states . . . .”); id. at 1 (“Congress consolidated many of 
these lands into the National Wildlife Refuge System . . . .”). 
 15. “Fee simple” is “[a]n interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by 
law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs.” Black’s Law Dictionary 733 (10th ed. 2014). 
Fee simple ownership is also referred to as ownership in perpetuity. Implicit in the concept of fee simple 
ownership is the idea that the boundaries of the property interest do not migrate; they are fixed. 
 16. For example, see infra Part II.A for a discussion of human-caused species declines due to 
reduced resource availability. 
 17. See Chen et al., supra note 9, at 1024 (stating that species are moving at a “rate of 16.9 
kilometers per decade”); see also Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary Responses to 
Recent Climate Change, 37 Ann. Rev. Ecology, Evolution, & Systematics 637, 637 (2006) (finding 
that “[p]redator-prey and plant-insect interactions have been disrupted when interacting species have 
responded differently to warming” and that “resource use and dispersal have evolved rapidly at 
expanding range margins”). 
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on a much larger scale and with much larger species populations. For 
example, humans introduced European grasses to the United States 
across millions of acres so that European cattle could graze in larger 
numbers.18 
U.S. regulators and conservationists have looked for fee simple 
solutions to species declines, including the conservation of both 
federally19 and privately20 owned lands. One such conservation strategy is 
conservation banking, which allows the “taking,” or the harming or 
killing of individuals of an endangered or threatened species, on one plot 
of to-be-developed land on the condition that the permittee compensate 
for this loss by buying habitat in a “bank” of land managed to preserve the 
target species “in perpetuity.”21 But what happens when the species moves? 
This Note argues that a fee simple reserve system is not the best 
conservation strategy for species that are sensitive to, and likely to 
migrate due to, climate change pressures. Approval of this conservation 
method should rest upon a scientific assessment of the likelihood that a 
given species will move as a result of climate change. For those species 
that are likely to move large distances as early as the next fifty to 100 
years, every fee simple acre devoted to conservation that the species can 
no longer use represents conservation value lost. In these instances, 
regulators should instead adopt a conservation strategy that moves with 
the species. To further this policy, this Note suggests that the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) adopt a “climate banking” system—a market-
based conservation scheme designed to fund monitoring and 
conservation efforts that follow species that are moving. For climate-
sensitive species, this solution provides a more suitable private-land 
conservation strategy than the current conservation banking system. 
 
 18. Joseph M. DiTomaso, Invasive Weeds in Rangelands: Species, Impacts, and Management, 
48 Weed Sci. 255, 255–57, 259 (2000) (naming several grasses that were introduced from Europe 
because American grasses did not grow quickly enough to meet grazing quotas). This is not to say 
humans have been entirely successful or deliberate in their introduction of species. But this example 
does display one large-scale example of humans changing millions of acres of habitat to manage a 
species at otherwise unsustainable levels. 
 19. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2014) (“[T]he public 
lands [will] be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of . . . ecological, environmental, air 
and atmospheric, [and] water resource[s], and . . . will preserve and protect certain public lands in their 
natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife . . . .”); see also Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a) (2014) (requiring the Secretaries of the Interior and 
Agriculture to “establish and implement a program to conserve [endangered and threatened] fish, 
wildlife, and plants”). This law applies both to public and private land. 
 20. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting the “tak[ing] of any [endangered or threatened] 
species within the United States [or its territorial seas]” (emphasis added)). This prohibition against 
taking does not distinguish between public or private land. 
 21. Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 
24,753, 24,753 (May 8, 2003) (“A conservation bank is a parcel of land containing natural resource 
values that are conserved and managed in perpetuity for listed species and used to offset impacts to 
the comparable resource values on non-bank lands occurring elsewhere.”). 
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Part I of this Note gives an overview of some of the present and 
future dangers species face and then shifts to a general discussion of the 
primary U.S. law designed to protect threatened and endangered species: 
the Endangered Species Act. Part II discusses conservation banking and 
proposed best practices, leading to an overall assessment of the 
effectiveness of conservation banking as a conservation strategy. Part III 
provides a study of the San Joaquin kit fox, an example of a climate-
sensitive species that is currently the target of several conservation 
banks. Part IV analyzes the adequacy of the responses by other scholars 
on the topic of climate change and conservation banking. In Part V, this 
Note discusses “climate banking,” a new conservation strategy that 
includes adaptive responses to climate change in the core of its 
conservation model. Finally, this Note discusses and refutes some 
potential drawbacks to this new strategy. 
I.  An Overview of the Human-Caused Threats  
to Vulnerable Species 
A. Negative Human Effects on Global Species Populations 
The world has entered what two authors have called “the 
Anthropocene” epoch, an age in history where human activities have 
“major and still growing [planetary] impacts.”22 Historically, human 
effects on species have been enormous, and they continue to grow as our 
seven-billion-strong population continues to increase at more than twice 
the rate of human deaths.23 Humans, just one species out of millions on 
Earth, use up to half of the terrestrial surface and over half of the global 
surface water.24 Today, humans are a major—likely the largest—cause of 
species extinctions.25 Scientists count habitat loss as one of “[t]he main 
causes of species extinction,”26 and humans are the largest source of 
 
 22. Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer, The “Anthropocene,” Global Change Newsl., 
May 2000, at 17, 17; see also Rodolfo Dirzo et al., Defaunation in the Anthropocene, 345 Sci. 401, 401 
(2014) (referring to the recent wave of species loss as “Anthropocene defaunation”). 
 23. Current World Population, Worldometers, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (dynamic clock showing the human population as over 7,287,385,650, with 
360,000 births per day and 148,600 deaths per day as of this printing). 
 24. Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems, 277 Sci. 494, 494 (1997) 
(concluding that “[b]etween one-third and one-half of [Earth’s] surface has been transformed by 
human action,” as well as “more than half of all accessible surface fresh water”). 
 25. Georgina Mace et al., Biodiversity, in 1 Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Current 
State and Trends 77, 79 (Rashid Hassan et al. eds., 2005) (“Over the past few hundred years humans 
may have increased the species extinction rate by as much as three orders of magnitude.”); see also 
Shahid Naeem et al., Preserving Nature, in 2 The Endangered Species Act at Thirty: Conserving 
Biodiversity in Human-Dominated Landscapes 70, 71 (J. Michael Scott et al. eds., 2006). 
 26. Mace et al., supra note 25, at 79; see also Naeem et al., supra note 25, at 72. Other human-
related impacts on species include, inter alia, the introduction of invasive species, hunting, pollution, 
and climate change. See Mace et al., supra note 25, at 79; Naeem et al., supra note 25, at 71. 
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habitat loss.27 Human-caused climate change also affects species viability 
through a combination of habitat loss and ecosystem changes that are 
occurring due to local changes in precipitation and temperatures.28 
Species extinction is occurring at a rate of as much as 1000 times the 
rate species were going extinct before humans began to hunt and farm.29 
This amounts to a loss of 150 to 200 species each day.30 This extinction 
rate may eventually lead to the loss of as much as fifty-eight percent of 
all species worldwide.31 
There are currently more than 20,000 threatened species worldwide,32 
including 1517 populations listed as being in danger of extinction in the 
United States alone.33 Left unchecked, it is clear that humans will continue 
habits that lead to species extinctions. Markets have traditionally ignored 
species loss as an externality to productive economic activities, such as 
farming or foresting.34 It is often even worse when species are valued in 
markets—with notable examples of unsustainable exploitation in 
rhinoceroses, gorillas, and elephants,35 to name a few. 
 
 27. See Naeem et al., supra note 25, at 72 (listing human-caused “habitat modification” as one of 
the main—likely the main—source of habitat decline). 
 28. Id.; see Mace et al., supra note 25, at 79. 
 29. Stuart L. Pimm et al., The Future of Biodiversity, 269 Sci. 347, 347 (1995) (measuring a range 
of an increase of species extinction rates “100 to 1000 times their pre-human levels”). 
 30. The State of the Planet’s Biodiversity: Key Findings from the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, U.N. Env’t Program, http://www.unep.org/wed/2010/english/biodiversity.asp (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015). 
 31. Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change 427 Nature 145, 146 (2004). 
This number varies greatly. In his analysis, Thomas estimates the total number of extinctions to range 
from as few as eleven percent of all species to as many as fifty-eight percent. See id. at 146, tbl.1; see 
also Mace et al., supra note 25, at 79 (estimating that “[b]etween 12 and 52 of species . . . are 
threatened with extinction”). 
 32. Table 1: Numbers of Threatened Species by Major Groups of Organisms (1996–2013), IUCN 
RedList, http://www.iucnredlist.org/documents/summarystatistics/2013_1_RL_Stats_Table1.pdf (last 
updated July 8, 2013). This number should be much higher. Of the over 70,000 species it has evaluated, 
the IUCN found 28.5 to be threatened. The total number of described species, however, is over 
1.7 million, and the total number of species may be over 8 million. If nearly thirty percent of the 8 million 
total species are threatened, then the total number of endangered species may amount to 2.28 million. See id. 
 33. Summary of Listed Species Listed Populations and Recovery Plans, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., Envtl. Conservation Online Sys., http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/Boxscore.do (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015). Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) counts thirteen species twice due to distinct 
geographical ranges. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., J.N. Pretty et al., An Assessment of the Total External Costs of UK Agriculture, 
65 Agric. Sys. 113, 125 (2000) (discussing the externalization of biodiversity loss from farming in the 
United Kingdom). 
 35. Edie Freedman, Tracking the Black Market in Endangered Species, O’Reilly (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://animals.oreilly.com/tracking-the-black-market-in-endangered-species (listing, inter alia, the 
price for gorillas at $40,000, elephants at $28,200, and one kilogram of Rhino horn at $97,000). The 
reasons for black market prices are complex and dependent on the region. For the purposes of this 
discussion, it is only necessary to note how valuable these species can be to some buyers. 
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B. The Endangered Species Act as a Response to Species Declines 
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) was created as a response to 
the massive loss of species habitat and population numbers in the United 
States from the start of Western colonization to 1973, when the ESA was 
enacted.36 Congress explicitly addressed this concern, noting that 
“various species . . . have been rendered extinct as a consequence of 
economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern 
and conservation.”37 
A species becomes “listed” under the ESA, meaning that it qualifies 
for protection, when the Secretary of the Interior finds that a species 
faces a danger of,38 or will likely face a danger of,39 becoming extinct 
either globally or locally. This protection applies to species on both 
public40 and private lands.41 Consistent with current scientific findings 
listing habitat loss as a key risk to species,42 a central mechanism of 
species conservation is habitat protection. Because of this, FWS prohibits 
certain types of habitat modification on private land if this modification 
would directly harm a listed species.43 
II.  Species Conservation on Private Land 
This Part first discusses the perverse incentive the ESA brought to 
bear on listed species present on private land, and then provides both the 
purpose and structure of conservation banking as a solution to this problem. 
A. The Perverse Incentives of the ESA 
It is difficult to imagine how species conservation could be 
successful without cooperation from private landowners. Private 
landowners own nearly seventy percent of the land in the United 
States.44 This percentage of privately owned land rises to as much as 
 
 36. J. Michael Scott et al., Introduction, in 1 The Endangered Species Act at Thirty: Renewing 
the Conservation Promise 3, 3–4 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006) (“[M]ore than five hundred species 
formerly found in the United States are presumed to be extinct . . . .”). 
 37. Endangered Species Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2014). 
 38. See id. § 1532(6) (defining “endangered species”). 
 39. See id. § 1532(20) (defining “threatened species”). 
 40. Id. § 1534(a). 
 41. Id. § 1538(1)(a)–(g) (listing the different types of prohibited acts which apply on both private 
and public land). 
 42. See Naeem et al., supra note 25, at 72–73. 
 43. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) 
(holding that the definition of harm “include[s] ‘significant habitat modification or degradation that 
actually kills or injures wildlife’” (quoting Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plans Rule, 
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995))). Under this definition of harm (one type of taking), private landowners can 
be liable under the ESA for using their land in a way that is unsuitable for species conservation. 
 44. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Managing the Working Landscape, in 1 The Endangered Species 
Act at Thirty: Renewing the Conservation Promise, supra note 36, at 101, 101. 
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ninety percent in some states.45 The remaining thirty percent of land in 
the United States is mostly underproductive land.46 As much as eighty 
percent of listed species use private land to some extent.47 To rest a 
conservation strategy solely on thirty percent of the least productive 
lands in the nation would likely fail. 
Since the ESA prohibits the “taking” of listed species, no matter 
where they are found,48 the Act places concrete restrictions on private 
land use when a listed species is present on private land.49 Although the 
ESA is meant to protect species from harm, the restriction on private 
land use where a listed species is found often provided a perverse 
incentive for private landowners to harm the very species Congress 
intended the ESA to protect.50  
Often, landowners purchase land for a specific economic purpose 
that could harm members of a listed species. The discovery of an 
endangered species on this land could lead to use restrictions that would 
prevent landowners from maximizing the expected economic gain from 
their land. If, for instance, a logger accidentally cuts down a tree that is 
home to endangered owlets and FWS finds that all the landowner’s trees 
are suitable endangered owl territory, the logger may be enjoined from 
cutting any of the remaining trees on her land. The discovery of a listed 
species could turn a profitable plot of land into a financially toxic one, 
especially if the landowner purchased this land with the intent of 
regularly harvesting lumber. 
This threat of substantial financial loss creates an incentive for the 
landowner to hide the existence of a listed species on her land from the 
federal government and others.51 The ESA comes into force against 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. “Take” is defined in the ESA as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect.” Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2014). 
 49. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2014) (stating the 
definition of harm “include[s] significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering”). 
 50. See generally Daowei Zhang, Endangered Species and Timber Harvesting: The Case of Red-
Cockaded Woodpeckers, 42 Econ. Inquiry 150 (2004) (discussing preemptive habitat destruction to 
prevent use by endangered species); Amara Brook et al., Landowners’ Responses to an Endangered 
Species Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 Conservation Biology 1638 
(2003) (discussing landowners’ negative responses to the potential listing of a mouse species, noting that 
many landowners sought to harm the species on their land and would not allow for information gathering 
on their land). After the Supreme Court decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities 
for a Great Oregon, there is no doubt that at least some modifications of private land that “actually 
harm” a listed species are forbidden under the ESA. 515 U.S. 687, 702–03 (1995) (rejecting private 
landowners’ argument that the ESA places no extra burden on private landowners because if the Secretary 
of the Interior wanted to, she could simply acquire owners’ land for public use under eminent domain). 
 51. Of course, there is also a financial incentive to rob a bank. The ESA is designed to criminally 
penalize anyone who takes a species. However, the bank analogy does not fully capture the “take” 
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private landowners if they actually harm a species, or if harm would 
result from a landowner’s proposed land use. Conversely, the landowner 
will only be liable if and when: (1) a federal agent or concerned citizen 
learns about the existence of the listed species on the owner’s land, and 
(2) there is admissible evidence of a taking. The low likelihood of 
reprisal and the frequently high stakes that are involved can create a 
strong economic motivation to kill, hide, or remove a listed species or its 
habitat from the land before the existence of the species becomes known 
to others. This creates what one author has labeled a “perverse 
incentive[] . . . to ‘shoot, shovel, and shut up.’”52 Or, to put a spin on the 
popular idiom “what you do not know cannot hurt you,” the landowner 
may conclude that “what the enforcer does not know cannot be harm.” 
B. Conservation Incentives and Incidental Take Permits 
Aldo Leopold once observed, “conservation will ultimately boil 
down to rewarding the private landowner who conserves the public 
interest.”53 Congress first authorized the use of conservation incentives 
by amending section 10 of the ESA in 1982.54 The goals of these policies 
are both to remove some of the negative incentives the harsh language of 
the ESA creates, as well as to add positive inducements for private 
landowners to willingly enlist the use of their private property into the 
conservation of federally listed species.55 All of the incentives that 
section 10 provide must flow through the incidental take permitting 
process.56 Incidental take permits (“ITPs”) allow the “taking [of listed 
species] otherwise prohibited by [the ESA] if such taking is incidental 
to . . . the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”57 For example, if a 
housing developer wishes to cut down trees that are part of endangered 
marbled murrelet nesting sites, she must request an ITP from FWS 
claiming she is carrying out some otherwise lawful activity. This is in 
 
dynamic. In the example of endangered species habitat on private land, there are no security alarms or 
CCTV cameras watching a person’s every move. A landowner who takes a species or destroys habitat 
often leaves little trace of either. The criminal deterrence aspect of the ESA is probably mildly 
effective. Nevertheless, the minimal threat of reprisal and the potentially large economic impacts both 
indicate that criminal deterrence alone will not likely save species. The threat of the stick does not 
refute the existence of the carrot. 
 52. Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for 
Streamlining the Process, 23 Ecology L.Q. 369, 382 (1996). 
 53. Aldo Leopold, The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays 202 (Susan L. Flader 
& J. Baird Callicott eds., 1991). 
 54. Sarah Matsumoto et al., Citizens’ Guide to the Endangered Species Act 35 (2003). 
 55. See id. at 47 (discussing a 1997 congressional bill intended to enhance existing “incentives for 
private landowners to protect species and their habitat”). 
 56. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2014) (discussing incidental take 
permitting requirements). 
 57. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
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contrast to the harshness of the pre-section 10 ESA that would give FWS 
no choice but to deny any land use that harmed listed species habitat. 
There are limitations on FWS’s discretion to allow the incidental 
taking of listed species. The permitting agent is only allowed to approve 
incidental takes if the permittee (the land developer), “to the maximum 
extent practicable, minimize[s] and mitigate[s] the impacts of such 
taking,” and “the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the 
survival and recovery of the species in the wild.”58 An approved ITP will 
enumerate conditions the developer must fulfill to ensure that she 
mitigates development impacts and does not further threaten the survival 
of the species.59 The prescribed conditions can either be performed on 
the landowner’s land60 or off-site in a compensatory mitigation scheme 
such as conservation banking.61 Of course, the incentive for these 
programs is the promise that FWS will leave the developer alone so long 
as she satisfies the conditions in her ITP. In the case of conservation 
banking, both the developer and the banker may receive an economic 
benefit from the conservation in the form of a development permit or 
funding to conserve land.62 
Section 10 truly began to take hold in the 1990s, amid a conservative 
swing in Congress.63 Then-Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, 
endeavored to make the ESA more politically palatable to congressional 
conservatives by promoting compromises to reduce perceived conflicts 
between development and species conservation.64 These incentives have 
taken various forms, including safe harbor agreements,65 candidate 
conservation agreements,66 and habitat conservation plans,67 a subset of 
which are conservation banks.68 
 
 58. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii), (iv). 
 59. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv). 
 60. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2014) (defining a 
habitat conservation plan as a plan “required by section 10(a)(2)(A) of the ESA that an applicant 
must submit when applying for an incidental take permit”). 
 61. See Memorandum from Dir. of U.S. Dep’t of the Interior on Guidance for the Establishment, 
Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks to the Reg’l Dirs. of Regions 1–7 & Manager of Cal. Nev. 
Operations 4 (May 2, 2003), available at https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/Conservation_ 
Banking_Guidance.pdf [hereinafter Banking Guidance] (explaining that the legal basis for 
conservation banking is grounded in section 10). 
 62. See id. at 1 (discussing the benefits of conservation banking for developers and bankers). For 
a discussion on conservation banking, see infra Part II.C. 
 63. See Dale D. Goble, Evolution of At-Risk Species Protection, in 2 The Endangered Species 
Act at Thirty: Conserving Biodiversity in Human-Dominated Landscapes, supra note 25, at 6, 21 
(explaining that Republican victories in 1994 led to increased debate regarding the ESA). 
 64. See id. at 21–22. 
 65. Thompson, supra note 44, at 119. 
 66. Id. at 122. 
 67. Id. at 106. 
 68. Jessica Fox et al., Conservation Banking, in 2 The Endangered Species Act at Thirty: 
Conserving Biodiversity in Human-Dominated Landscapes supra note 25, at 228, 228. 
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C. Conservation Banking 
Conservation banking curiously started in 1995 with a bad bank 
loan.69 Before 1995, ITPs were issued but there was no guarantee that 
FWS would approve these proposed conservation plans, which created 
high transaction costs.70 Bank of America obtained Carlsbad Highlands, 
a proposed housing development, through the foreclosure of a 6.8 million 
dollar loan.71 This land was valued far below the value of the loan as a 
result of a late-1980s California housing bust.72 This property was, and 
still is, the site of the habitat of the coastal California gnatcatcher, an 
endangered bird.73 Listed as threatened under the ESA, the presence of 
the coastal California gnatcatcher further decreased the value of the 
land.74 After Bank of America considered its options, it decided to push 
for the creation of a “banking” system.75 Under this new banking system, 
conservation bank owners were contractually bound to conserve species 
and their habitat in “conservation bank” land preapproved by FWS for 
ITP mitigation purposes. Because the bank land is preapproved for 
mitigation, FWS assured developers that buying banking credits would 
allow the agency to quickly approve the developers’ mitigation 
proposals, reducing time, cost, and uncertainty.76 The Carlsbad 
Highlands conservation bank is still operational today, its credits fully 
sold.77 
In 2003, nearly eight years after California established its first 
conservation bank, FWS officially approved of the practice and wrote 
guidelines to implement conservation banking nationwide.78 According 
to FWS guidelines, conservation banking is beneficial from at least four 
 
 69. Anne T. Lawrence, The Emergence of Conservation Banking in Southern California, in Ahead of 
the Curve: Cases of Innovation in Environmental Management 93, 93 (Ken Green et al. eds., 2001). 
 70. See id. at 100. James Jackson, Vice President of Bank of America’s Costa Mesa office, 
explained “how screwed up the [federal ITP] system was . . . [developers would] go out and find some 
property for mitigation, take it to the feds, and the government would [refuse to approve it].” Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 95–96. 
 73. Carlsbad Highlands Conservation Bank, Species Banking, http://us.speciesbanking.com/ 
pages/dynamic/banks.page.php?page_id=7191 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 74. Id. Traditionally, endangered species on private land inhibited a variety of potential land uses. 
Even in the case of incidental take permitting, land use is restricted and landowner duties to protect 
the listed species increase. This places a cloud on the title, decreasing the value of the land. See Ike C. 
Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for 
Reform, 24 Cumb. L. Rev. 1, 67 (1993) (citing National Environmental Forum Survey, Times-Mirror Mags., 
June 1992, at 23) (discussing land devaluation arising from ESA species protection on private land). 
 75. See Lawrence, supra note 69, at 100–01 (summarizing Bank of America’s efforts in creating the 
conservation banking system). 
 76. Id. at 100 (stating that a “preapproved bank . . . would take the guessing out of [mitigation 
proposals],” and that preapproved banks would create a “superior product [that would get] preferential 
treatment in the [mitigation] marketplace”). 
 77. Carlsbad Highlands Conservation Bank, supra note 73. 
 78. See generally Banking Guidance, supra note 61. 
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perspectives: FWS’s, the developer’s,79 the owner of the conservation 
bank’s (“banker”),80 and the species’.81 First, banking is attractive to 
FWS because it encourages participation in federal conservation efforts 
by private landowners.82 Banks can be large enough to mitigate dozens of 
projects, and tend to be better managed than other mitigation strategies.83 
Second, the developer benefits because banking “saves time and money 
by identifying pre-approved conservation areas [and] sellers [and by] 
simplifying the regulatory compliance process and associated 
paperwork.”84 Third, from the banker’s perspective, banking can turn the 
financial liability of having listed species on her land into a long-term 
income-generating activity.85 Finally, banking is beneficial to species 
because a species ostensibly has a professionally restored and managed 
habitat available for eternity, through efforts such as revegetation and 
stream improvement. 
The conservation banking system is arguably more protective of 
species than many other of today’s private land use conservation 
strategies. As its name suggests, conservation banking requires the 
landowner to conserve the species. In the context of the ESA, a mandate 
to “conserve” is stronger than the typical section 10 mandate to 
“mitigate” adverse impacts as a result of the incidental take.86 Mitigation 
is, for the most part, a negative duty, as it requires that a landowner do 
nothing directly to harm a species and to limit the incidental harm her 
actions cause to the species.87 Conversely, the ESA defines conservation 
 
 79. It is possible that ITPs may be granted for purposes other than what is traditionally referred 
to as “development.” The label “developer” is used in this Note as a label to help differentiate 
between the buyer of credits (developer) and the seller of credits (banker). 
 80. The literature does not refer to the group of landowners that own conservation banks as 
bankers, but the name seems appropriate. The landowner-banker conducts a transaction that deposits 
the value of the developer’s investment in a bank. Of course, this comparison is not directly parallel. 
Nevertheless, the label is suitable, and it serves the purpose of distinguishing between the parties 
involved in banking transactions. 
 81. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 1. 
 82. See id. at 2 (“Conservation banking reduces the piecemeal approach to conservation efforts that 
can result from individual projects by establishing larger reserves and enhancing habitat connectivity.”). 
 83. Id. (explaining that conservation banks can be “large enough to accommodate the mitigation of 
multiple projects”). For a list of comments discussing the failure of other types of mitigation tools, see 
Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,595 (Apr. 10, 2008) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) (“[T]here is greater risk and uncertainty associated with in-lieu fee 
programs regarding the implementation of the compensatory mitigation project and its adequacy to 
compensate for lost functions and services.”); see also id. at 19,619 (“[O]n-site avoidance often result[s] in 
small areas for compensatory mitigation projects, which are unlikely to function properly.”). 
 84. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 1. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2014) (provision requiring 
incidental take permittees to “minimize and mitigate” adverse impacts to listed species that will result 
from their proposed land use). 
 87. Mitigation, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2014) Mitigation includes:  
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action.  
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as the use of all methods necessary to recover listed species.88 Although 
“conservation” in the context of the ESA is a term of art that does not 
necessarily require conservation bank owners to fulfill the statutory 
conservation mandate of the ESA, conservation banking does typically 
impose more land use restrictions and other affirmative duties on the 
bank owner. Bankers are typically required to: 
 enter into a Conservation Banking Agreement with the Service; 
 grant a conservation easement to an eligible third party, 
precluding future development of the property and restricting certain 
land uses;  
 develop a long-term management plan for the conservation 
bank; and 
 provide funding for monitoring and long-term management of 
the conservation bank.89 
These assurances are typically more elaborate than the conditions of 
other ITPs.90 For instance, most other permits will not typically require a 
conservation easement on the land set aside for mitigation purposes, but 
this is commonplace in the context of conservation banking. 
The process of establishing a bank and receiving an ITP is relatively 
straightforward. Banking is market driven, so it should only exist where 
there is a demand for development on land inhabited or used by listed 
species.91 When the developer decides to develop land that contains a 
listed species or its habitat, she may apply for an ITP that would allow 
her to “take” a small number of the listed species so long as the taking is 
 
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its 
implementation.  
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected 
environment. 
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance 
operations during the life of the action.  
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or 
environments.  
Id. I refer to this as a negative duty because, unlike a conservation mandate that would require a 
landowner to take active steps to improve a species’ habitat, mitigation only requires the landowner to 
take steps to ensure the species is no worse off than it was before the landowner’s activities. 
 88. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). 
 89. For Landowners—Conservation Banking: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/conservation-banking-faq.html (last updated July 15, 
2013). 
 90. Habitat conservation plans (“HCPs”) require the permittee to fulfill mitigation conditions in 
the ITP. However, HCPs do not require the permittee to place a conservation easement on her land, 
restricting many land uses for the foreseeable future. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife 
and Plants Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(3) (2014) (not listing a conservation easement as a mandatory 
term in a habitat conservation plan). 
 91. See John Merrifield, A Market Approach to Conserving Biodiversity, 16 Ecological Econ. 
217, 221 (1996) (describing the effect of market forces on market-driven environmental trading 
systems, such as conservation banks). 
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incidental to the purpose of the permit.92 Since the proposed 
development will take a listed species, FWS will place conditions on the 
approval of the ITP that provides for the minimization and mitigation of 
adverse effects of the developer’s proposed land use.93 If there is a 
conservation bank in the area,94 FWS or the developer can request that 
the developer’s mitigation occur through the purchase of bank “credits.”95 
D. Credit Concerns 
A banking credit is “a unit of measure representing the 
quantification of species or habitat conservation values within a 
conservation bank.”96 FWS explains this more fully in its guidelines: 
The values of the natural resources are translated into quantified 
“credits.” Typically, the credit price will include funding for the long-
term natural resource management and protection of those values. 
Project proponents are, therefore, able to complete their conservation 
needs through a one time purchase of credits from the conservation 
bank. This allows “one-stop-shopping” for the project proponent, 
providing conservation and management for listed species in one 
simplified transaction.97 
Despite its relatively innocuous definition, the concept of 
“quantifying” nature has been hotly debated.98 Scholars have noted that 
assigning a value to listed species habitat runs a high risk of 
miscalculation.99 Just like any other market that trades in dissimilar 
items, for conservation banking to exist there must be fungibility, or the 
ability to find a common trading denominator.100 This fungibility is 
 
 92. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2014) (providing for approval of ITPs 
for the incidental take of listed species). 
 93. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2014) (mandating conditions that minimize and mitigate harm to listed 
species in a habitat conservation plan). 
 94. The service area is typically “located within areas designated in recovery plans” of listed 
species. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 8. Developers wishing to develop within a given species’ 
protected range will normally be able to compensate for the use of this land by purchasing credits in a 
bank that is the species habitat range near the development site. See id. at 8–9. 
 95. Id. at 4. 
 96. Id. at 17. 
 97. Id. at 2. 
 98. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 
53 Stan. L. Rev. 607, 607 (2000) (stating that environmental trading markets often trade in 
“nonfungibilities” of “type, time, and space”). 
 99. See generally id. (discussing the complications with the commodification of natural 
resources). 
 100. The easiest example of this is the use of currency. In many early markets, people traded one 
good for another—such as a pair of shoes for two shirts. Because most items are of unequal value in 
the market, they are said to lack fungibility. Conversely, currency creates a common denominator for 
consumers to exchange. Additionally, the dollar is fungible—each U.S. dollar is of identical value to 
the market. Benjamin Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History-on Commerce, 
Tyranny, and the Modern Law of Money, 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 115, 118 n.16 (1987). In the 
conservation banking market, “credits” serve a similar function as the U.S. dollar. Developers who 
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largely a false construct, as many of the items being traded will not be 
equivalent.101 Nonetheless, environmental market participants must 
equate the value between one lost acre of to-be-developed land that is 
currently home to the coastal California gnatcatcher on Blackacre to the 
value of the to-be-conserved gnatcatcher habitat on Greenacre. To do so 
requires some method of valuation based on our understanding of each 
land value as it relates to the species. For instance, if gnatcatchers require 
scrub oak for nesting and only prey on a certain type of coastal insect, 
the credit may be valued based on the availability of each habitat feature 
in Blackacre and Greenacre, respectively. If Greenacre is rich in prime 
habitat relative to Blackacre, then Greenacre’s habitat will be valued 
more highly per acre than Blackacre’s. 
As FWS conservation banking guidelines suggest, the valuation 
system is mostly static. There is only one transaction between the 
developer and banker and only one set value for Greenacre’s credits.102 
Once both are valued, these values practically never change. FWS 
contends that it can change the value of bank credits, but it is highly 
constrained from doing so for two notable reasons. First, once a 
transaction is complete, it cannot be undone.103 The permittee will not be 
required to purchase more credits if the banker’s land becomes less 
valuable. FWS is allowed to penalize bankers, but doing so may force the 
banker to devote banking funds to litigation that could better be spent 
maintaining and restoring habitat. Second, even if FWS could change the 
value or suspend the sale of the remaining credits in a bank, this threat is 
moot in cases where a banker has completely sold all of the bank’s 
credits.104 This rigidity prevents any meaningful change once a bank is 
established. Even if the needs of the species change or new conservation 
 
must mitigate the destruction of ten acres of an endangered species’ habitat can accomplish this 
mitigation through the purchase of credits on the banking market. At least in the eyes of the banking 
market, this makes the destroyed and banking habitats fungible. 
 101. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 98, at 662–64 (discussing the nonfungibilities of type, space, 
and time). 
 102. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 9 (stating that, for a certain type of conservation bank, 
“credits should be based on the biological values of the bank at the time the bank agreement is established”). 
 103. FWS conservation bank guidelines do not explicitly state that credits cannot be recalled, but it 
is nonetheless unlikely that they can be. For example, in the section of the guidelines labelled 
“Remedial Actions,” FWS does not state that credit recall is an acceptable remedy for bankers who do 
not adequately perform their conservation duties. See id. at 14. The most drastic measure envisioned 
by the guidelines is to force the absent banker to sell her land to a responsible third party who will 
continue to conserve it. See id. 
 104. Once a credit is sold, its value is fixed. Changing the value of sold credits would only add 
instability to the market. Thus, if a bank’s credits have all been sold, FWS no longer considers altering 
the value of the credits as a penalty. Although FWS has not indicated that it would consider penalizing 
negligent bankers by forcing them to buy credits in other banks to compensate for the low quality of 
their own bank, this could be a possible remedy. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 14 
(discussing remedial action in the form of suspending pre-sale credits but not listing a credit-
reevaluation remedy for banks that have sold all their credits). 
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strategies become available, the conditions in the banking agreement 
may prove resistant to the addition of new strategies. In light of 
something as dynamic and challenging as climate change, this resistance 
to change may not adequately conserve climate-sensitive species. 
This rigidity in credit values is deliberate. Without predictable credit 
prices, both bankers and permittees may find the investment to be too 
risky.105 Conservation banking markets need fungibility to function, so 
FWS pushes habitat features into artificial boxes of similar habitat 
features.106 As the founder of the banking system recognized, “a 
preapproved bank . . . would take the guessing out of [the incidental take 
permitting process].”107 A lack of market clarity could very easily push 
many, if not most, market participants away from buying and selling 
credits. 
A fee simple, single-transaction market system may provide market 
stability, but it also creates the risk of more externalities or permanent 
losses for which the bank does not account.108 The largest potential 
externality of a one-off investment in species habitat is that it cannot 
account for that land’s future value to the target species or any other 
species. In the realm of climate change, habitat could be irreversibly 
modified in the next fifty to one hundred years, let alone in the duration 
imagined by the artificial concept of ownership in perpetuity. Rising sea 
levels could swallow coastal habitat; drought could dry and then burn 
forest habitat. In short, the banking system externalizes the reality that 
many species can or must move from their current habitats in the coming 
decades. In this future scenario, conservation banks would externalize all 
conservation costs that must occur outside of the bank’s boundaries 
when banking species move off the banking habitat. Every acre of 
banking land originally intended for perpetual conservation that can no 
longer be used by the species is bank value lost. Every new acre enlisted 
outside of the bank that must add protective measures for listed species 
due to species movement is a cost for which the conservation banking 
system does not account. 
 
 105. Silvia Wissel & Frank Wätzold, A Conceptual Analysis of the Application of Tradable 
Permits to Biodiversity Conservation, 24 Conservation Biology 404, 407 (2010) (“High transaction 
costs may reduce market activity and may arise as a result of complicated and time-consuming 
administrative procedures.”). 
 106. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 98, at 662–64. For example, the cost of establishing a bank 
may be prohibitive without some initial up-front investment. It follows that there may be a lag 
between when the listed species habitat is destroyed on the developed land and when the bank is able 
to compensate for that loss. When a species lives without suitable habitat comparable to the habitat it 
lost, this time is permanently lost; it can never be recompensated. 
 107. Lawrence, supra note 69, at 100 (discussing the historically ambiguous ITP approval policy of FWS). 
 108. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 98, at 624–25, 662–64. 
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III.  Case Study: The San Joaquin Kit Fox 
The San Joaquin kit fox illustrates why banking may not be well-
suited for some species. The kit fox is a native California species 
historically found throughout California’s San Joaquin Valley.109 
Adapted to desert and grassland habitat,110 its numbers began to decline 
dramatically due to increased human presence and land development.111 
Now, the kit fox lives on the small fragments of undeveloped land that 
can still support it—mostly on the Valley’s outskirts.112 
A study by M. Rebecca Shaw and others modeled the effect that 
climate change would have on the remaining populations of the San 
Joaquin kit fox.113 Shaw projected the kit foxes’ likely climate change-
related movement from today to 2100.114 The Shaw study concluded that 
within fifty to one hundred years, little to no suitable habitat would 
remain throughout the entire area currently home to the kit fox.115 The 
Shaw study found that “[e]stablishing a static network of connected 
reserves through acquisition or set-asides may not be effective in the 
future given ecological, economic, and social responses to climate change 
are likely to be nonlinear and multidirectional.”116 
The high likelihood that the kit fox will move away from most or all 
of the lands it is currently inhabiting makes it a difficult species to 
manage within a fee simple paradigm, and conservation banking will 
likely not be an adequate conservation solution. Nonetheless, the kit fox 
is a current target species in at least five conservation banks.117 In the 
Palo Prieto Conservation Bank, it is the only species targeted for 
protection, and in the Haera Wildlife Conservation Bank, it is one of 
 
 109. Endangered Species Prot. Program, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Endangered Species 
Facts: San Joaquin Kit Fox 1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/espp/factsheets/san-joaquin-
kitfox.pdf [hereinafter Kit Fox Facts]. 
 110. Id. (describing kit fox habitat as “largely annual grassland”); see also Theresa Nogeire et al., 
Presentation on Impacts of Habitat Loss, Climate Change and Pesticide Exposure on Kit Fox 
Populations at the Ecological Society of America (Aug. 5–10, 2012) (stating that kit foxes are “desert-
adapted”). 
 111. See Kit Fox Facts, supra note 109, at 1. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See M. Rebecca Shaw et al., Economic Costs of Achieving Current Conservation Goals in the 
Future as Climate Changes, 26 Conservation Biology 385, 389 tbl.1 (2012) (identifying the kit fox as 
having a narrow climatic range, a long dispersal distance, and requiring at least 215,501 hectares of 
land to survive as a species). 
 114. Id. at 387. 
 115. Id. at 391 fig.2 (graph showing the ratio of undeveloped “area with suitable climate . . . to the 
baseline conservation goal under climate change”). 
 116. Id. at 394. 
 117. Conservation and Mitigation Banks in California Approved by CDFW, Cal. Dep’t of Fish & 
Wildlife, https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Conservation/Planning/Banking/Approved-Banks (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Approved California Banks] (listing currently approved conservation banks 
in California, including those for the San Joaquin kit fox). 
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only two protected species.118 If Shaw’s models are correct, then by as 
early as 2050, neither the banks nor their surrounding lands will provide 
suitable habitat for the kit fox due to likely changes in vegetation and 
water availability, which could eliminate suitable resources for the fox 
and its prey.119 
Banking may be a good short-term solution for the kit fox. It 
provides the fox with suitable, maintained habitat mostly free of 
pesticides and land uses that are incompatible with the fox’s needs.120 
However, conservation banking will likely not provide a long-term 
solution in light of the kit fox’s predicted response to climate change. 
Bankers who attempt to dutifully maintain kit fox habitat may 
nonetheless find that kit foxes, their habitat, or their food sources have 
moved. Alternatively, if the conservation bank habitat remains suitable 
as land outside of the bank becomes unsuitable, the banking system may 
create an ecological “island” population of kit foxes.121 This “island” 
population may then be unable to rejoin or move with larger populations of 
the fox that could potentially move great distances due to climate change. 
IV.  Potential Solutions to Species Movement Due to Climate 
Change Within the Conservation Bank Paradigm 
Relatively few authors have addressed the issue of climate 
adaptation as it relates to conservation banking. One set of authors 
suggests maintaining the current banking system, but handling climate-
change issues on a case-by-case basis due to “the difficulty in predicting 
the magnitude and impact of climate changes in specific regions.”122 
However, these authors do not suggest how this case-by-case analysis 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Nogeire et al., supra note 110; see Basic Facts About San Joaquin Kit Foxes, Defenders of 
Wildlife, http://www.defenders.org/san-joaquin-kit-fox/basic-facts (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) 
(discussing threats to the kit fox, including drought, climate change, and habitat modification, which 
make it difficult for kit foxes to find food). 
 120. Nogeire et al., supra note 110 (summary of the effects of climate change and pesticides on kit 
fox populations); see also Paul Schaefer, Kit Fox Gets Some Protection in California, Envtl. News 
Network (Sept. 27, 2007, 7:41 PM), http://www.enn.com/wildlife/article/23452 (listing some conservation 
measures undertaken at a kit fox conservation bank intended to “maintain or enhance the health and 
ecology of the natural habitat”). 
 121. A habitat “island” could be any species habitat that is separated from other suitable habitat 
on all sides by unsuitable habitat. See Angela D. Yu & Simon A. Lei, Equilibrium Theory of Island 
Biogeography: A Review, in Shrubland Ecosystem Genetics and Biodiversity: Proceedings 163 
(2001), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_p021.pdf (commenting on “the theoretical 
similarities between [ocean] islands and fragmented mainland landscapes”). 
 122. Robert Bonnie & David S. Wilcove, Ecological Considerations, in Conservation & 
Biodiversity Banking: A Guide to Setting Up and Running Biodiversity Credit Trading 
Systems 59 (Nathaniel Carroll et al. eds., 2008). 
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might be conducted; their only advice is to stay away from species’ upper 
and lower habitat ranges.123 
At least one author has analyzed this problem in depth. In his Note, 
Tristan Kimbrell found that conservation banking, as it currently exists, 
may be insufficient to protect listed species.124 Kimbrell analyzed three 
alternative strategies for confronting the issue of conservation bank 
species moving: (1) maintaining the current banking system as-is, (2) 
proactively purchasing banking land where species will likely move, and 
(3) forcing current bankers to either purchase other banks’ credits or buy 
more banking land when species have moved off their lands.125 
Kimbrell rejects leaving the banking system “as-is”126 for reasons 
already addressed in this Note.127 Namely, the species may move, leaving the 
banker with the compulsory yet depressing task of maintaining a habitat for 
a species that is no longer present. Kimbrell also eliminates the second 
solution of proactively creating banks in potential future species 
locations.128 Kimbrell concludes that this solution will likely fail because, 
even with our best modeling of future species movements, models will 
likely “not be able to accurately predict where a listed species will occur 
in the future,” and such a modeling system would be costly.129 This 
banking policy would also be unable to predict future land use changes 
that may decrease the quality or the effectiveness of a future bank.130 
Kimbrell finally settles on a “stepping-stone approach,” where the 
“conservation bank owner must buy land where the species currently 
exists and must either create a conservation easement for those new 
lands, or buy credits for that species in another conservation bank where 
the species currently exists.”131 Kimbrell suggests that current bankers 
would be able and willing to afford this because bank owners can 
terminate the conservation easement on their land then sell it, or they 
could alternatively use the money earned from the original bank 
purchase to purchase a conservation easement or bank credits on new 
land.132 Under Kimbrell’s proposal, conservation bank land must be 
 
 123. See id. (suggesting a case-by-case approach for siting conservation banks and advising bankers to 
use caution when siting near the southern or northern limits of species ranges, but offering no further advice). 
 124. See Tristan Kimbrell, Note, Moving Species and Non-Moving Reserves: Conservation Banking and 
the Impact of Global Climate Change, 22 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 119, 120 (2010) (explaining that when 
“species migrate[] away from the conservation bank land due to climate change or some other ecological 
interaction, . . . developers are developing land but the species is not being protected in the long-term”). 
 125. Id. at 139. 
 126. Id. at 119, 141–43 (noting that “[m]oving species present a problem for non-moving preserves 
because the species meant to be protected may migrate out of the fixed preserve”). 
 127. See supra Part III. 
 128. Kimbrell, supra note 124, at 145. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 146. 
 132. Id. 
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easily interchangeable with new, equally valued land where the species 
currently exists. One acre in the banker’s old bank would simply be 
replaced by one new acre where the species has moved. The conservation 
easement that the banker has placed on the banking land could 
essentially be removed from the old banking land and transplanted to the 
new land. The cost to improve the new plot of land must also be 
accounted for in the initial credit purchase in the old bank. 
Kimbrell’s approach will likely fail for several reasons. First, 
Kimbrell does not account for the dynamics of multispecies or 
multipurpose banks. For instance, the majority of conservation banks in 
California are set up for multiple species, or for both species and 
wetlands mitigation.133 Since conservation banking and wetlands 
mitigation—a market-based conservation system for wetlands—flow 
through different statutes and require separate credit sales and 
permitting processes, it would not likely be as simple as a banker pulling 
up tent poles and relocating with the species.134 In addition, species will 
move off the banker’s property in any direction that contains suitable 
habitat.135 This problem may be compounded in the case of a 
multispecies bank, since different species tend to respond to climate 
change and habitat modifications differently.136 With these factors in 
mind, a land sale and relocation mandate for bankers could range from 
being financially stringent to impossible. 
Kimbrell’s preferred solution also ignores the subjective attachment 
that landowners have with their land.137 If the banking contract 
practically requires landowners to be disgorged from their lands to afford 
 
 133. See Approved California Banks, supra note 117. 
 134. The Army Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to 
permit wetland dredging and filling through section 404 of the Clean Water Act. Clean Water Act 
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2014). These agencies have interpreted this authority to allow for 
mitigation banking, a market-based credit system akin to conservation banking. See Mitigation 
Banking Factsheet, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/ 
mitbanking.cfm (last updated Mar. 20, 2014) (defining mitigation banks, and stating that “[t]he value 
of a bank is defined in ‘compensatory mitigation credits’”). The section 404 permitting authority is 
independent of the authority to approve ITPs for listed species through section 10 of the ESA. Even if 
it would make sense for an endangered species to be protected on another site, a banker who has sold 
both species and wetlands credits would not be able to abdicate her duties under the Clean Water Act. 
The banker would still be required to maintain the wetlands located within the original bank for 
mitigation banking purposes. 
 135. See Shaw et al., supra note 113, at 394 (describing species dispersal in response to climate 
change as “nonlinear and multidirectional”). 
 136. Id. at 389 tbl.1 (showing conservation goals, ranging from narrow climatic range and short 
dispersal distance to wide climatic range and long dispersal distance). 
 137. See Po-Hsin Lai & Urs P. Kreuter, Examining the Direct and Indirect Effects of 
Environmental Change and Place Attachment on Land Management Decisions in the Hill Country of 
Texas, USA, 104 Landscape & Urb. Plan. 320, 321 (noting that people often form “emotional ties 
[with their land] that provide an anchor for individuals to cultivate a sense of self, self-esteem, and 
belonging”). 
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credits in other banks when a target species moves, this could act as a 
disincentive for would-be bank owners who would like to keep their land 
whether they retain the profit from a conservation bank or not. 
Landowners in this category may refuse to enter into new conservation 
banking contracts, even in the unlikely event that these new contracts 
proved more lucrative. This would further weaken an already thin 
banking market, which would make it more difficult for bankers to fulfill 
Kimbrell’s suggested requirement of purchasing new credits or 
easements when species move. 
In addition, conservation easements are likely more difficult to 
remove than Kimbrell suggests. An easement is a property right in 
perpetuity.138 Contrary to Kimbrell’s suggestion, conservation easements 
are incredibly difficult to extinguish or modify, even with the police 
power of eminent domain.139 Thus, a conservation banker who would 
prefer to sell her old banking land may very well end up stuck with both 
a financially unattractive piece of property containing a conservation 
easement and a duty to purchase more credits with money she may not 
have. With regard to species that will likely disperse widely over the 
coming years, bankers would be left with the duty to purchase many 
more acres of conservation easements, leaving a trail of ecologically 
beneficial but financially toxic land in the banker’s wake. If the initial 
complication of multispecies banks is not enough to prevent would-be 
bankers from entering into the market, the “continual purchase” provision 
would act as a glaring “DO NOT ENTER” sign to future bankers. 
Finally, Kimbrell’s solution could create costly litigation in an 
industry that is already cash strapped and sparsely litigated.140 For 
example, under Kimbrell’s proposal, bankers might need to sue to: 
(1) terminate conservation easements on their old conservation banks; 
(2) challenge an FWS decision that the conservation bank’s target species 
are moving off of the banking land; or (3) challenge contract terms 
requiring bankers to purchase credits in other banks or divest in their 
 
 138. Derrick P. Fellows, Note, Kelo, Conservation Easements, and Forever: Why Eminent 
Domain Is Not a Sufficient Check on Conservation Easements’ Perpetual Duration, 35 Wm. & Mary 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 625, 630 (2011) (stating that even eminent domain is an “inadequate remedy to 
counteract the otherwise perpetual nature of many conservation easements”). 
 139. See generally id. (discussing the complex legal issues involved in exercising eminent domain 
against conservation easements); see also Dana Joel Gattuso, Conservation Easements: The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly, Nat’l Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y Res. (May 2008), http://www.nationalcenter.org/ 
NPA569.html (“Outcomes [from attempts to terminate conservation easements] could differ depending 
on the specific language of the easement, state law, and interpretations of the residing courts. Laws 
generally favor honoring perpetuity, primarily because grantors receive federal tax benefits for donating 
or selling conservation easements only if they are perpetual.”). 
 140. Currently, conservation banks are hardly ever the subject of litigation. This could change, 
however, if landowners were contractually obligated to either sell land that they did not wish to sell or 
buy new land they are unable to afford. These added duties could easily compel bankers to litigate 
against FWS to challenge the terms of their banking agreements. 
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own banks. This sort of legal conflict would use resources better spent on 
species conservation, on both the federal and private sides. 
V.  Climate Banking 
A. Climate Banking as a Viable Alternative to Conservation 
Banking 
As species move in response to climate change, the static 
assumptions on which a reserve-based system, such as conservation 
banking, rests will likely fail to adequately conserve species.141 Current 
models of species movement implicate a more dynamic approach to 
species conservation that assumes species movement in response to the 
multifarious pressures of climate change and habitat modification. 
Therefore, any new conservation policy that FWS promotes should be 
more climate-adaptive. These new climate-adaptive strategies should not 
simply seek to conserve species where they currently are; instead, these 
new strategies should proactively seek to conserve species as they move. 
As FWS indicates in its conservation banking guidelines, it views 
market-based conservation incentives as a viable incentive to promote 
conservation on private land.142 If FWS chooses to continue to use a 
market-based system to conserve listed species, it should do so under a 
more climate-adaptive framework. I refer to this new system as “climate 
banking.” 
Unlike the purely fee simple conservation banking system, climate 
banking aims to incorporate species movement into its conservation 
strategy. Under a climate-banking system, FWS can continue to use its 
current conservation banking credit system to acquire the financial 
means to conserve species on private land.143 On the land to be 
 
 141. Thompson, supra note 44, at 103 (“To the degree that the habitat of a species is evolving, a 
pure reserve strategy also may not be ecologically sustainable in the long run.”). 
 142. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 1 (“Conservation banking is attractive to landowners 
and land managers because it allows conservation to be implemented within a market framework, 
where habitat for listed species is treated as a benefit rather than a liability.”). 
 143. Although there is no unanimous support of the commodification of species habitat, FWS has 
signaled that it plans to continue to endorse market-based conservation incentives on private land, 
such as conservation banking. Commodification will consistently fail to capture the true value of 
species habitat as it is available today and in the future, and this value will be consistently in flux both 
in the short and long term. At the very least, a market-based credit system can provide more 
conservation resources for moving species than other schemes currently available. Although it is a less 
than ideal solution, I propose climate banking under these practical and political constraints. See 
Wissel & Wätzold, supra note 105, at 404 (“[T]he application of tradable permits to biodiversity 
conservation is a complex issue because destroyed and restored habitats are likely to differ. There may 
be various trade-offs between the ecological requirements that destroyed and restored habitats be as 
similar as possible, and the need for a certain level of market activity to have a functioning trading 
system.”); but cf. Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at i (asserting that conservation banking promotes 
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developed, climate credits can be calculated as they were before, with a 
monetary conservation value attached to them. The developer can 
purchase these credits on an open market within the service area of the 
bank, as is the current practice. 
The main difference between conservation banking and climate 
banking is that these credits will not be sold exclusively to fee simple 
banks. Instead of promoting the conservation of a purely fee simple 
conservation system, “climate credits” will be sold to a “climate 
banker”—a private conservation organization that enters into an 
agreement with both the developer and FWS to follow the climate bank’s 
target species as it moves. Under a climate-banking agreement, the 
climate banker’s duty of following the target species will be two-fold: to 
monitor species movement and to implement conservation measures 
where the target species are found. 
The monitoring component of climate banking would serve the 
important function of tracking species. This sort of tracking is of 
paramount importance since one of the largest “unknowns” of how 
species will respond to climate change is where species will move.144 This 
sort of species tracking could be undertaken either intrusively, through 
the insertion of subdural GPS devices into certain individuals of the 
banking species, or unobtrusively, by periodically searching for signs of 
species on land, such as the presence of fox dens.145 As the climate 
banker monitors and tracks the species, it would have an affirmative duty 
to report this information to FWS and to publicize this information, 
either through the maintenance of its own website or through FWS’s 
maintenance of a nationwide information clearinghouse.146 As the 
 
the purpose of the ESA because it “provides a collaborative incentive-based approach to endangered 
species conservation, which . . . can aid in the recovery of the species”). 
 144. See Kimbrell, supra note 124, at 145 (arguing that a “weakness of [the purchasing future 
habitat] approach is that ecological models may not be able to accurately predict where a listed species 
will occur in the future to make this approach feasible”). 
 145. Biologists use both methods to monitor and track study species. So long as the climate 
banking company works with the approval of FWS, any “taking” under the ESA should be approved, 
and, therefore, incidental to the climate banker’s goal of species conservation. See Robert R. Ream et 
al., Population Dynamics and Home Range Changes in a Colonizing Wolf Population, in The Greater 
Yellowstone Ecosystem: Redefining America’s Wilderness Heritage 349, 352–54 (Robert B. 
Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1994) (radio-collar tracking of species movements); Khristen Foss, OR-7 
(The Lone Wolf) Continues to Travel, Rocky Mountain Tracking (Dec. 6, 2011) (GPS tracking); 
James Hadler et al., West Nile Virus Surveillance in Connecticut in 2000: An Intense Epizootic 
Without High Risk for Severe Human Disease, 7 Emerging Infectious Diseases 636, 636 (2001) 
(visual tracking). This sort of tracking could easily fall under the ESA section 10 take exception, 
allowing “any act . . . for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected 
species, including, but not limited to, acts necessary for the establishment and maintenance of 
experimental populations.” Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (2014). 
 146. The information-gathering step is crucial, and it is also often very cost intensive. Conservation 
efforts can only actively protect those individuals of a species that can be located. See David T. 
Barnett et al., The Art and Science of Weed Mapping, 132 Envtl. Monitoring & Assessment 235, 236 
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climate banker collects this information, it can also report any 
unauthorized takings of listed species, which could improve the 
enforcement function of the ESA.147 
Although information gathering is an important step in conserving 
species as they move, climate bankers would need to use the majority of 
the resources they receive from climate credits to actively conserve the 
species where it is found on private land. Habitat restoration and 
maintenance activities should focus on holistically accommodating the 
target species’ resource needs on private land. Also, climate bankers 
could be encouraged to aggressively adopt new proven conservation 
strategies as they are developed.148 
As listed species move, they will enter different privately held land. 
Once a climate bank’s target species moves, the climate banker would 
then need to obtain permission to conduct its conservation activities on 
those private lands. Climate bankers can obtain this permission through 
the ITP process. For example, if a landowner wishes to use portions of 
her land already in use by a listed species, she would likely need to 
obtain an ITP, which would contain conditions meant to protect the 
listed species. One such ITP condition would be to allow the climate 
banking company access to relevant portions of the landowner’s land to 
conduct its conservation activities. Since the climate banking company 
already has an approved conservation strategy, climate banking could 
then be used to streamline the incidental take permitting process on 
private land. In this scenario, the private landowner may be responsible 
for mitigating the adverse effects of her incidental take, but the climate 
 
(2007) (“Mapping[, a form of information gathering,] records what, how much, and where . . . species 
exist on a landscape, and, when implemented over time and space . . . helps predict the spread of 
species, facilitates the exchange of data between agencies, and increases public and political 
awareness.”); see also You Can Be a Scientist, Too!, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatestudents/ 
scientists/citizen-science.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (listing various organizations and projects that 
request volunteers to help gather information “by observing the world around [them] and reporting 
what [they] find”). 
 147. This suggestion is tenuous. FWS walks a thin line between promoting conservation and 
creating enmity towards it. Deputizing climate bankers as FWS reporters could create deep distrust 
between landowners and climate bankers, which could limit climate bankers’ access to target species 
and foster general distrust for their work. However, having bankers constantly survey private land for 
signs of listed species could also help FWS fulfill its mandate to protect listed species. Although 
admirable, I would advise against making climate bankers play an enforcement role, at least until they 
have become better established in the field. 
 148. Other conservation methods have proven to be inflexible and may disincentivize adoption of 
new conservation strategies. See Lawsuit Challenges Plan to Log 150,000 Acres in Northern 
California, Center for Biological Diversity (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/ 
2013/fruit-growers-supply-08-12-2013.html (discussing a habitat conservation plan containing a fifty-
year contract term where the landowner would only be required to meet mitigation measures agreed 
upon at the signing of the document). 
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banker would be responsible for using the assets it has acquired from 
credits sold to it to take on the more costly task of conserving the species 
on private land.149 
At the same time that climate banking companies are conserving 
and monitoring species where they are found, climate bankers could 
proactively encourage target species to use ecosystem corridors 
predetermined to be ecologically suitable paths to larger public lands.150 
To achieve this, climate bankers could establish and sell credits to 
proactively restore and maintain habitat in these “least-cost” corridors, 
with the understanding that there is a high likelihood that target species 
will prefer to use, and will tend to fare better, on these paths.151 
Currently, conservation banking is primarily conducted by for-profit 
organizations that specialize in conservation banking.152 The new climate 
banking system could be conducted by these same for-profit 
organizations, with a similar or greater degree of auditing and reporting 
than these organizations are subject to under the current system.153 
Because these organizations specialize in habitat management, FWS 
generally considers their work to be of an acceptable quality.154 
However, environmentally focused nonprofit organizations and local 
agencies would also be able to perform these same duties, possibly with 
less doubt that these organizations are “act[ing] in the public interest.”155 
Currently, all three types of bankers are encouraged to manage banks 
and sell credits. Unless one type of organization (public, private, or 
nonprofit) proves to be more effective or trustworthy at managing 
 
 149. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 2 (discussing the difference between mitigation and 
conservation). 
 150. See Kristeen Penrod et al., S. Coast Wildlands Project, South Coast Missing Linkages 
Project: A Linkage Design for the Tehachapi Connection 9 (2003) (discussing a study mapping a 
set of least-cost corridors for several listed species, defined as “the zone in which [all modeled species] 
would encounter the least energy expenditure,” which would increase species’ chances of survival). 
 151. See id. at 8. 
 152. See Wildlands: The Leader in Mitigation Banking, Wildlands, http://www.wildlandsinc.com/ 
about/company-overview (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see also Approved California Banks, supra note 
117 (listing all the banking sites in California, categorized by ownership type). 
 153. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 13, 16–17 (listing reporting and monitoring 
requirements required to be placed in the banking agreement). In particular, climate banking could 
profit from more explicit and increased auditing requirements. Increased FWS auditing would be 
advised especially when climate banking is first introduced to ensure this conservation strategy proves 
beneficial to the managed species and to iron out any wrinkles. 
 154. I found little discussion about the benefits of one organization over another in the 
conservation banking context. However, the longer-established and similar mitigation banking 
programs have discussed the advantages of each type of bank owner. See, e.g., Compensatory 
Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,606 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230). In another market-based banking context, that privately owned banks “have 
certain advantages. They have a strong financial incentive to provide effective, timely mitigation that 
may be lacking for noncommercial entities.” Id. 
 155. Id. 
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climate banks over time, all three should be encouraged to participate in 
this new market.156 Since commercial entities are the main participants in 
the current banking market, it would seem natural that they would also 
be the vanguard of any new banking system. 
The inception of a new climate banking incentive system does not 
entirely obviate the need for conservation banks or other reserves. Even 
if climate banks become the main focus of the market-based private 
conservation movement, conservation banks could be used as stints in 
the “artery” corridors keeping these least-cost corridors open. Since 
these corridors will likely be valuable highways for the movement of 
multiple species in the future, conservation banks could be funded and 
maintained as a conservation easement in perpetuity. The owners of 
these strategically placed conservation banks would be required to assist 
the conservation mandate of the climate banker for the duration that the 
target species remain on the conservation banker’s land. However, in the 
climate-change scenario, the overall goal of the conservation bank would 
be to make movement to listed species’ ultimate habitat possible. 
As with conservation banking, climate bankers will have to have 
some incentive structure to encourage good work. In the current 
conservation banking system, private bankers are, at a minimum, 
financially motivated to effectively manage their land. They are also 
contractually bound to regularly fulfill certain minimum duties, and they 
risk losing the ability to sell credits and to manage their banking land if 
they fail to meet these requirements.157 FWS may also require the banker 
to post a “bond equal to the present value of the management costs . . . 
to ensure performance.”158 FWS should continue to use all of these 
tactics to ensure private banker performance. For nonprofit and 
government actors, the incentive will not only be fear of breach of 
contract and other remedial action, but also that that these organizations 
are inherently motivated to “act in the public interest.”159 Additionally, 
all three types of organizations would suffer reputational losses if they 
fail to satisfactorily meet their climate banking obligations. A loss in 
reputation may lead to organizational difficulty in fundraising, selling 
credits, or getting new bank lands approved for sale. 
 
 156. Currently, there is insufficient information to determine whether there should be a preference 
for public, private, or nonprofit management of these banks. Unless and until there is a consensus 
favoring or disfavoring one organizational type of banker, I propose to allow all three players to 
continue to participate in this new market. 
 157. See Banking Guidance, supra note 61, at 14 (discussing remedial actions in the event the bank 
owners fail to meet their obligations). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,606 
(Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
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B. Potential Problems with the Climate Banking System 
Although climate banking has clear conservation advantages with 
regard to managing populations of moving species, the mobility of this 
new program may also cause some noteworthy drawbacks. First, despite 
the incentives climate banking may offer to landowners, there may still 
be resistance to letting strangers onto landowners’ lands for trust and 
privacy reasons. For instance, a landowner may be concerned that the 
climate banker may report observed malfeasance to FWS, such as 
destroyed habitat or injury to protected species, which may cause FWS to 
initiate an enforcement action against the landowner. Additionally, 
landowners may simply feel uncomfortable with having guests on their 
land whom they would not have otherwise invited. If several landowners 
in a key corridor refuse access, this refusal could stymie the work of the 
climate banker and weaken efforts to conserve the listed target species. 
As to landowners’ concerns about being reported for ESA 
violations, FWS already attempts to ease landowner fears through 
selective enforcement of the ESA and the addition of “no surprises” 
clauses in their ITPs.160 With “no surprises” clauses and the broader ITP 
structure, FWS guarantees landowners will not be penalized for an 
incidental take of species or unforeseen habitat destruction on their 
land.161 With regard to landowners’ other privacy concerns, ITP 
conditions normally require the landowner to permit FWS access to their 
land for auditing and inspection purposes.162 Presented with a choice to 
allow a climate banker or a government official onto their land, 
landowners may prefer to provide land access to the climate banker. 
Finally, any trust issues and privacy concerns will likely diminish as 
climate bankers become an established presence and landowners begin to 
form relationships with these organizations. 
 
 160. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(2)(A)–(F) 
(2014) (guaranteeing that FWS will not hold landowners liable for incidental takings of listed species 
so long as permittees meet permit conditions for species listed in their ITPs); see also Spirit of the Sage 
Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79 (D.D.C. 2003) (FWS asserting that the no surprises rule is 
simply a codification of their preexisting authority to selectively enforce the ESA). 
 161. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Habitat Conservation Plans: Section 10 of the Endangered 
Species Act 1 (2005), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCP_Incidental_Take.pdf. 
FWS only guarantees protection from enforcement in response to unintentional harm. Nothing in any 
future regulatory scheme will likely reward landowners who intentionally harm a listed species. 
Therefore, any guarantee the “no surprises” policy and ITPs provide to landowners will likely be 
limited to unintentional harm only. Landowners who intentionally harm species may still expose 
themselves to being reported to FWS by climate bankers. 
 162. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Serv. et al., Habitat Conservation Planning 
and Incidental Take Permit Processing Handbook app. 4 at 5 (1996), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/Hcpapp4.pdf (permit template listing as one of FWS’s 
responsibilities as “monitor[ing] the implementation [of the Permit] including each of the terms of [the 
Implementing] Agreement . . . in order to ensure compliance with the Permit”). 
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FWS also has the option to employ more forceful methods to ensure 
landowner cooperation. Most importantly, landowners who wish to 
continue to use land that is a listed species’ habitat need to have a valid 
ITP in order to do so. FWS could grant permits only on the condition 
that if a species is the target of a climate bank, the climate banker will be 
allowed to conduct its conservation activities on relevant portions of the 
landowner’s land. Since climate banking may reduce the total cost of the 
landowner’s ITP performance, it is reasonable to imagine that many 
landowners would welcome the addition of this term. If FWS chooses to 
allow some landowners to exclude climate bankers from their lands, 
FWS could either require the recalcitrant landowner to purchase extra 
climate bank credits to offset their incidental take, or FWS could transfer 
the extra cost of conservation that would have been covered by the 
climate banker onto the private landowner in the form of stricter on-site 
ITP conditions. In situations where landowners take on the climate 
banker’s conservation duties, climate bankers may still play an important 
advisory role by instructing the landowner on how to effectively perform 
her new duties. 
Second, following species that are dispersing in several directions 
may become very costly for climate bankers, or some habitat 
modifications may be relatively expensive to undertake. Since climate 
banking would be a voluntary market, the risk of costs outrunning profits 
would likely be the main reason climate bankers would not enter into 
this market. 
There are several ways in which climate bankers could mitigate 
these costs. First, FWS could limit climate bankers’ duties until their 
bank has a certain minimum amount of credits purchased. For instance, 
climate bankers may only be initially required to maintain a limited 
portion of the target species’ service area at first, which would then grow 
as the banker’s bank becomes better established. If populations of a 
species start to split into distinct segments, a climate banker who does 
not have the resources to conserve all populations could also apply to 
FWS to only conserve certain populations. Next, if the climate banker 
reports to FWS that a target species is expensive to conserve, FWS could 
internalize this cost by raising the cost of climate credits to developers. 
Alternatively, FWS could provide funding to climate bankers to control 
excessive costs. 
Despite these potentially unforeseeable costs, climate banking may 
prove to be a more cost-effective solution than conservation banking. 
Unlike conservation banking, climate banking would not require bankers 
to conserve land in fee simple. Thus, although climate bankers may need 
to be more mobile than conservation bankers, climate bankers would 
feasibly be able to function at a fraction of the cost of conservation 
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banking.163 As with conservation banking, climate bankers must pay to 
improve and maintain climate banking land. Because climate bankers 
may continually move with the species, the cost of habitat improvement 
and maintenance would potentially be greater than that of the 
conservation bankers, who would likely be required to improve their 
banking land less often. This increased cost should be offset by the 
climate bankers’ avoidance of land purchase and annual land taxes. 
Additionally, climate bankers may be able to substantially reduce the 
cost of land improvement by proactively improving least-cost corridors 
for use by multiple climate banking species.164 
Conclusion 
The best scientific information we have indicates humans are the 
major cause of global climate change. Humans are responsible for a 
greatly magnified rate of species extinction. Many believe that 
conserving species is simply the right thing to do. However, even the less 
environmentally motivated members of our species can recognize the 
immense economic and informational benefit other nonhuman species 
have. Each lost species signals the permanent loss of millennia of 
information and future value. In the end, each lost species is a lost 
opportunity. 
Although some species, such as humans and cockroaches, are better 
equipped to acclimate to a variety of ecosystems, a vast majority of 
species are not so lucky. To these species, a changing climate means 
changed habitat. When crucial features of species habitat move, change, 
or disappear, most species are strained to react. Without active human 
efforts, thousands to millions of species may go extinct. 
Conservation banking has been heralded as one of the most positive 
environmental compromises to come out of the ESA. With policies such 
as this, landowners may no longer view endangered and threatened 
species on their land as an obstruction to financial gain. Banking shows 
how conservation can be both financially and ecologically beneficial. 
However, the theory behind conservation banking fails to account 
for species movement. Conservation banks, like the wildlife reserve 
 
 163. Conservation banking combines the costs of fee simple ownership and species conservation in 
perpetuity. Of the two up-front costs, the fee simple ownership would normally be the more expensive 
by several orders. However, the continuing cost of conservation in perpetuity, by its very nature, 
would eventually outstrip the cost of the fee simple purchase of even very expensive land. Since 
climate banking potentially envisions protecting species over much broader and more dynamic ranges 
and may incur extra costs in the form of habitat restoration as species move, I would suggest that FWS 
employ some of the cost-reducing mechanisms I discuss in this Part. That is, if conservation costs 
expand beyond revenue brought in through the sale of climate credits. 
 164. See Penrod et al., supra note 150, at 8 (discussing the benefits of maintaining “least-cost” 
corridors—corridors of improved habitat that species could use to migrate in response to climate change). 
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system, may have been seen as an ideal system to protect species in an 
earlier era. However, this system fundamentally fails to account for one 
of the most dynamic forces in human history: climate change. 
Conservation banks cannot be the full solution to species protection. 
In the future, conservation policies must focus on protecting species 
where they are, not just where policymakers would like them to be. In 
order for future conservation policies to be effective, policymakers must 
build climate-adaptive measures into current laws and regulations. If we 
are to use a market-based approach that takes climate change into 
account, this system will have to be an adaptive one. Climate banking has 
the ability to better conserve listed species as they move, and it would do 
so without substantially disrupting the current market system that FWS 
promotes through its conservation banking policy. It is through the 
promotion of policies such as climate banking that FWS will be better 
able to conserve listed species on the move as a result of climate change. 
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